Azerbaijan Mulls Lifting Arms Embargo on Ukraine After Russian Strikes on SOCAR Assets

When Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, spoke on the phone with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, on August 10, 2025, both leaders condemned what they called "targeted Russian airstrikes" on Azerbaijani energy facilities inside Ukraine. The strikes hit assets belonging to the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in the Odessa region, prompting Baku to hint that it might lift its long‑standing arms embargo on Kyiv if Moscow continues its "aggressive policy".

Background: Energy Ties That Bind

The partnership between Azerbaijan and Ukraine is only a few months old but already strategic. In July 2025, Naftogaz of Ukraine signed a gas‑supply pact with SOCAR, routing Azerbaijani gas through the newly inaugurated Trans‑Balkan Gas Pipeline. The line began operations on June 28, 2025, delivering an initial 3 billion cubic metres per year – modest in volume but politically potent, signaling Kyiv’s desire to diversify away from Russian pipelines.

Historically, Baku kept a careful distance from the Ukraine war, focusing on its own neighbourhood conflicts. The September 2023 flash operation that reclaimed Karabakh from Armenia, followed by a 2020 flare‑up and the eventual Russian peace‑keeper withdrawal, gave Azerbaijan confidence to push a more independent foreign policy, often leaning on Turkey and Israel for support.

The August Attacks: Two Days, Two Blow‑outs

On the night of August 6‑7, Russian forces unleashed a swarm of drones on the Orlovka compressor station in the village of Novoselske, Odesa Oblast. The site, a key hub that pushes Azerbaijani gas through the Trans‑Balkan route, was pelted by "dozens of drones" according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy. While the compressors survived, the attack was undeniably a message: Moscow could disrupt the new energy link at any moment.

Just hours later, on August 7‑8, five Shahed‑type kamikaze drones slammed into SOCAR’s oil depot in the same oblast. The strike ignited a blaze, ruptured a diesel pipeline and left four SOCAR employees with serious injuries. The depot, built in 2024, was one of the few Azerbaijani‑owned facilities on Ukrainian soil.

Ukrainian officials described the Orlovka attack as an attempt to "damage Kyiv's trade relations with Baku and other partners," suggesting the strikes were meant to pressure both Baku and Kyiv simultaneously.

Diplomatic Reactions: From Phone Calls to Public Warnings

Following the attacks, Aliyev and Zelenskyy exchanged a terse conversation that was later summarized by the Azerbaijani state news agency Caliber.Az. The agency, citing "reliable sources," reported that Baku was now weighing the possibility of lifting its arms embargo and sending weapons to Kyiv – a stark reversal of policy that has been in place since the early 1990s.

Russia did not sit idle. On August 11, Aleksei Fadeev, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, warned Baku that any move to arm Ukraine would "only worsen the situation" and reiterated Moscow’s claim that Kyiv is a "neo‑Nazi regime." The warning came during a TASS‑broadcast briefing and was aimed squarely at deterring Baku from taking the next step.

Why Baku Might Flip the Switch

The calculus for Azerbaijan is shifting. CEPA analysts note that the successful 2023 peace deal with Armenia, bolstered by Turkish backing, has emboldened Baku to act more assertively. Moreover, the energy agreement with Ukraine offers a new lever – if Russian strikes continue, Baku could retaliate not just with diplomatic protests but with tangible military aid.

In a late‑August interview with Al Arabiya, Aliyev described the 1920 Soviet takeover of Azerbaijan as an "occupation" – a rare public rebuke of Russia that underscores the depth of Ankara’s and Tel Aviv’s influence on Baku’s foreign policy. The president also said in Kelbajar on August 21 that "Azerbaijan must always be ready for war," showcasing newly acquired special‑forces units, upgraded aircraft and fresh fighter‑jet contracts.

Regional Ripples: South Caucasus at a Crossroads

If Azerbaijan does lift the embargo, the move could reshape the security architecture of the South Caucasus. Turkey, a longtime ally of both Kyiv and Baku, would likely welcome more weapons flowing eastward, while Israel, which has supplied drones to Azerbaijan in the past, could see new opportunities for arms sales.

For Russia, the stakes are equally high. The Kremlin’s influence in the Caucasus has already been eroded by the Ukraine war and the 2023 US‑backed Azerbaijan‑Armenia peace deal. A Baku‑Ukraine arms corridor would further marginalize Moscow, potentially encouraging other former Soviet states to reconsider their own security postures.

What Comes Next?

Analysts say the next few weeks are critical. Kyiv will likely press Baku for concrete commitments, while Moscow may increase the frequency of attacks on Azerbaijani assets in Ukraine to test the limits of Baku’s resolve. Meanwhile, the United States and European Union are watching closely, ready to adjust sanctions or security aid depending on how the triangle evolves.

For now, Azerbaijan’s official stance remains ambiguous – a diplomatic tightrope that balances economic interests, regional alliances and the ever‑present risk of escalation.